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Abstract Macroeconomic events often require individuals and policy-makers to
make decisions that they are not accustomed to making. For example, a sovereign
debt crisis makes it necessary to either default on government debt, increase taxes,
cut public spending or to impose a mixture of these measures. I argue that decisions
on such matters are not derived from deep preferences; they require reflections and
judgement under uncertainty. Past experiences and the interaction with other indi-
viduals are likely to influence the salience of preferences in the situations of
decision making. Using a simple model, I illustrate how the salience of preferences
changes with different degrees of individuality and conformity. Individuality is
associated with the importance of private habits, while conformity is related to the
perceived dissonance between initial intuitions and social opinions. The results
obtained from simple simulation exercises stress that a high degree of conformity or
a low degree of individuality may lead to overreactions when social opinion makers
err for a short period of time. At the same time, a low degree of conformity or a high
degree of individuality or leads to delayed adjustments to new circumstances.
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1 Introduction
Decisions on macroeconomic issues are often characterized by a high level of
abstractness, uniqueness and uncertainty. For instance, if a sovereign debt crisis
occurs, should the government default on its debt, or implement spending cuts and
tax increases? Or, should a central bank adopt an inflation target? As I will argue in
this paper, individuals cannot be expected to have so-called ‘‘deep’’ preferences on
such issues. I propose a simple way to model the formation of preferences as the
result of an interaction between what I call private motivating intuitions (or initial
convictions) and social opinions. Preference formation is rational in the sense that
individuals reflect on their preferences and do not act thoughtlessly. This is modeled
as a process in which the salience of preferences is influenced by the degree of
individualism and conformity. In this way, the preference-formation process
provides reasons for preferences and preference modifications. As I refer to a
minimal definition of rationality, full consistency or transversality are not
necessarily attributes of rational behavior. While the macroeconomic debate on
rationality mainly centers on the formation of expectations, I focus on the role of
rationality in the formation of preferences.
Using a simple model, I illustrate how the salience of preferences changes with
different degrees of individuality and conformity. Individuality is associated with
the persistence of private motivating intuitions or convictions and conformity is
related to the perceived dissonance between private intuitions and social opinions.
The results of simple simulation exercises where experts or policymakers influence
social opinions stress the importance of individuality in determining the salience of
preferences. A high degree of individuality or a low degree of conformity prevents
individuals from overreacting. A low degree of individuality and a high degree of
conformity, however, lead to overreactions in cases where social opinion makers
(for example experts or policy-makers) err for a short period of time. But high
individuality and low conformity may also have drawbacks: if the degree of
conformity is low or the degree of individuality is high, delayed adjustments may be
observed.
As mentioned above, I assume that an individual’s action-inducing preferences
over possible worlds, states or outcomes depend on two factors: the intuitions that
motivate the individual and social opinions that implicitly attach different weights
to the motivating intuitions. Social opinions are influenced by ‘‘opinion-makers’’
such as experts, policy-makers or journalists. In the approach taken in this paper,
social opinions are not chosen strategically and cannot be attributed to persons. An
active interaction between individuals and social opinions is therefore not modeled
in this paper. Both private intuitions and social opinions are essential for individual
behavior. Changes in social opinions can cause changes in private habits by giving
rise to new perceptions and dispositions within individuals. In this way, changes in
social opinions produce downward effects. When deriving preferences, individuals
partly interiorize social opinions. These arguments are related to the concept of
procedural rationality proposed by Simon (1976), according to which the choice at a
particular point in time is context-specific. This involves a rejection of the idea that
human nature, or at least the motives, goals and preferences of individuals are
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entirely psychologically given. However, as it is shown in this paper, this does not
involve a rejection of the importance of individuality.
In psychological terms, one could argue that private motivating intuitions are
produced by the ‘‘fast system’’, while the action-inducing preferences are
determined by the ‘‘slow system’’. In this way, the motivating intuitions together
with the social opinions determine the salience of preferences. It has been shown
that the past influences the current salience of preferences. This brings us to the
notion of habits. Habits are propensities for responding in a specific way to a
particular class of situations (see, for instance, Rutherford 1994). Repetition is an
important feature of habits. Habits, however, are much more complex than mere
repetitions and involve the imitation of others, which makes habits closely related to
social institutions. According to Hodgson (2004), ‘‘…the reason why we have
evolved the capacity to form habits is to deal with the uncertainty, complexity and
variability of circumstances…’’. This stresses the importance of studying habits in
the context of macroeconomics and, in particular, rare macroeconomic events that
are often associated with uncertainty, complexity and uniqueness. The understand-
ing of the notion ‘‘habit’’ in this paper as being related to preferences differs from
the understanding in parts of the macroeconomic literature, where habits are formed
over economic variables such as consumption and may yield correlated behavior or
correlated choice over time.1
By acknowledging the existence of habits, I argue that macroeconomics should
take into account that preferences of individuals can be endogenous, in particular
over the medium- and long-term. In this paper, preferences of individuals are the
result of an interaction between private motivating intuitions (influenced by private
habits) and social habits or, as I call them, social opinions. Social opinions act as a
weighting function that individuals use to attach different weights to their intuitions.
By emphasizing the importance of private intuitions and social opinions, the model
of this paper does not strictly adhere to methodological individualism. But, at the
same time, individuals are not exclusively seen as purely social beings. Private
motivating intuitions are influenced by private habits and are associated with
individuality. Conformity is characterized by collective behavior. Conformity
implies that the social status is sufficiently important for an individual. Individuals
depart from their heterogenous intuitions or convictions to partly conform to a
single, more homogeneous way of behavior.
The arguments made in this paper are inspired by various sources. The
importance of habits and endogenous preferences was stressed long ago by the
proponents of the early institutionalist movement in the 1920s and 1930s (see
Rutherford 1994 or Hodgson 2004 for useful overviews). In addition, this paper
draws on the literature on endogenous preferences in microeconomics (see, for
example, Rabin 1994, 2013; Bowles 1998, 2004). Conformity has been analyzed in
an economic model, for instance, by Bernheim (1994). Interpreting social habits or
opinions as a weighting function for private motivating intuitions has certain
relations to the arguments in Dietrich and List (2013), and the discussion in the
philosophy and economics literature on reasons for preferences. Recently, Hoff and
1 See, for example, Ravn et al. (2006).
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Stiglitz (2010) introduced the notion of ‘‘social constructs’’, which is very similar to
the notion of social habit used by others and the notion of social opinions in this
paper. They argue that social constructs provide the cognitive frames that
individuals use to shape their perception. Similar to my arguments, Rodrik (2014)
uses the notion of ‘‘ideas’’ to describe how policy decisions are derived. My paper is
also loosely related to the literature on social capital (see, for instance, Knack and
Keefer 1997), although I do not interpret social opinions as being capital stock. As
noted by Rabin (2013) and Harstad and Selten (2013), trying to improve the
psychological realism of economics does not necessarily imply that one has to
entirely reject the concept of optimization. Instead, incorporating the impact of
habits or the desire for conformity can be done within the existing modeling
framework.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates a simple
modelling approach of endogenous preference formation that takes into account the
private and social dimension of preference formation. Section 3 presents the results
of simple simulation exercises. Finally, Sect. 4 contains the conclusion.
2 Modeling individuality and social conformity
This section describes a modeling approach for the formation of preferences that
incorporates private intuitions and social opinions. I propose a way to link the
private and social sphere by the desire of individuals to act in conformity with their
social environment. Individuality is modeled as the importance for an individual not
to deviate from his private habits or private convictions. An individual first develops
motivating intuitions that start the process of finding underlying reasons for action-
inducing preferences. The set of motivating intuitions that is relevant for an
individual at a given point in time is denoted by I. These motivating intuitions are
relevant if the individual perceives to be in a state in which these intuitions are
relevant.2 I is a subset of an infinite set of possible intuitions M, which includes all
the intuitions that can become motivating for an individual.
The motivating intuitions provide an individual with an initial salience of a
preference. In a public debt crisis, for instance, an individual may develop intuitions
over measures to cope with the crisis. Such measures may consist of tax increases,
government spending reductions or sovereign default. If an individual remembers
having experienced a similar situation before, he may, for instance, intuitively favor
tax increases over spending cuts and this may in turn be preferred to default. If the
individual does not remember having experienced a similar situation before, he will
be intuitively indifferent toward these alternatives. Consider an example where a
country is in a serious public debt crisis that results in high deficits and public debt
that needs to be cut. I assume that in the state of a crisis, the following private
intuitions may become salient:
(S) The country should reduce spending, because this solves the crisis.
2 This perspective is similar to the approach in Dietrich and List (2013), although the methodology used
in their paper is different from the one in this paper.
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(T) The country should increase taxes, because this solves the crisis.
(D) The country should default on its debt, because this solves the crisis.
For instance, having the intuition (S) implies that an individual consciously or
unconsciously has a model in mind according to which spending cuts represent the
best way to deal with a debt crisis. Instead, having the intuition I = (S, T) means
that an individual‘s intuition tells him that the country should both increase taxes
and reduce spending in order to solve the public debt crisis. Other potential
intuitions of an individual may be, for example, I = (S, T) or I = (D). Clearly, two
individuals can well have different intuitions allowing for a nuanced perspective on
disagreements between two individuals. Intuitions are formed by what psychologists
may call the automatic or fast system.
With time, an individual starts to reflect on his intuitions. When reflecting on his
reasons, an individual is influenced by private habits and the degree of dissonance
between private intuitions and social opinions. As Elster (2009) said, ‘‘…a reason
demands the reason for that reason…’’. Private habits and social opinions help an
individual reflect on his intuitions and provide the reasons for the reasons.
Individuals develop private habits in the salience of their intuitions, which implies
that they have a desire to avoid variations in their preferences. The social opinions
provide the thinking framework while an individual learns from society in the
course of experience. They impact on the individual via his desire to reduce the
perceived degree of social dissonance. Following this reasoning, an individual
i maximizes the following function in trying to extract the maximum possible
salience over possible alternatives:
max
Z
p
t
Zst ðiÞZpt ðiÞ 
j
2
Zpt ðiÞ  bZpt1ðiÞ
 2 l
2
Zpt ðiÞ  Zst ðiÞ
 2 ð1Þ
Z
p
t ið Þ is the private salience and Zst ið Þ is the social opinion. In the following, I am
going to denote Z
p
t ið Þ and Zst ið Þ by Zpt and Zst for ease of discussion. The desire of an
individual to act in conformity with social opinions is captured by l that weights the
‘‘conformity term’’ (Z
p
t - Z
s
t )
2. In addition, social opinions also act as weights of
importance for the individual in the term Zst Z
p
t . j determines how much an indi-
vidual dislikes to deviate over time from his private habits or convictions. b stands
for the degree of forgetting past convictions. It can be considered as a memory
parameter and determines the persistence of private habits. Therefore, we call it the
parameter that captures the degree of individuality. Using the squared disutility
terms j
2
Z
p
t  bZpt1
 2
and l
2
Z
p
t  Zst
 2
implies that the sign of the difference
between the two terms inside the parenthesis does not impact on the size of the cost.
The assumption of quadratic costs for deviations from private habits and social
dissonance and the implied linearity of the first-order condition keep the simple
model tractable. Maximizing (1) with respect to Z
p
t gives the first-order condition:
Zst  l Zpt  Zst
  j Zpt  bZpt1
  ¼ 0 ð2Þ
This can be rearranged to get an expression for the evolution of the salience of the
preference Z
p
t :
Endogenous preference formation on macroeconomic issues 53
123
Zpt ¼
jb  Zpt1 þ ð1 þ lÞ  Zst
lþ j ð3Þ
This difference equation in Z
p
t implies that, in a long-run stationary equilibrium, the
private salience equals the salience of the social opinion (that is Zp ¼ Zs), if
lþjjb
lþj
 
¼ ð1þlÞlþj , or, simplified: j(1 - b) = 1. For the simulation exercises of the
Table 1 Initial values of the
salience of private intuitions
Individual Salience of private intuitions
1 0.1
2 0.2
3 0.3
4 0.35
5 0.5
6 0.6
7 0.7
8 0.8
9 0.9
10 0.95
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Individual Differences: High Degree of Conformity
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Individual Differences: Low Degree of Conformity
Fig. 1 Individual differences and conformity (Solid Line average salience of individual preferences;
Dashed Lines saliences of individual preferences)
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next section, I choose a deliberately arbitrary, but nevertheless plausible parameter
value of 0.975 for b. If j = 40, there is no systematic deviation between the
salience of the private initial convictions and the salience of the social opinion.
Additionally, it is assumed that l = j = 40, which implies that individuals dislike
deviations from private habits in the same way that they dislike deviations from
conformity. These parameter values imply that there is a monotonic convergence to
the stationary equilibrium, because 0\ jblþj \1. The parameter values chosen for
the remaining simulation exercises also satisfy this condition.
3 Understanding the basic properties of the model
3.1 Baseline simulations
This section presents simulations using the simple model and the parametrization
described in the last section to illustrate how the degrees of individuality and
conformity impact on the evolution of individual preferences and the difference
between individual and social opinions. Table 1 presents illustrative and purely
arbitrary initial values Z
p
0 for the individual salience of preferences for 10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Individual Differences: Low Degree of Individuality
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Individual Differences: High Degree of Individuality
Fig. 2 Individual differences and individuality (Solid Line average salience of individual preferences;
Dashed Lines saliences of individual preferences)
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individuals. The salience of the social opinion is also chosen in an illustrative and
arbitrary way at Zs0 = 0.3. In the baseline version of the model in this subsection, Z
s
t
is held constant at the initial value.
Simple simulation exercises illustrate that individual differences vanish over time,
but the pattern depends on the degrees of individuality and conformity. A low degree
of individuality (j = 10) or a high degree of conformity (l = 80) reduces the period
of time until heterogeneity diminishes, and a high degree of individuality (j = 80) or a
low degree of conformity (l = 10) increases this time span (Figs. 1, 2).
3.2 Temporary changes in social opinions
This section investigates the effects of when social opinions signal a temporary
higher social salience of a preference. Experts, journalists or policy-makers may
publicly express changing salience’s of preferences for a short period of time. How
do conformity and individuality impact on the degree of salience? This is examined
by comparing the effects of long- and short-lasting changes in social opinions on the
average salience of preferences. Figure 3 analyzes the case where the degrees of
individuality and conformity are either lower or higher than in the baseline scenario
(j = 10 for a low degree and j = 80 for a high degree of individuality; l = 10 for
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Low Degree of Individuality and High Degree of Conformity
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
High Degree of Individuality and Low Degree of Conformity
Fig. 3 Long-lasting changes in social opinions (Solid line baseline parameter values; Dashed line
Alternative)
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a low degree and l = 80 for a high degree of conformity). I assume that from
period 6 to 12, social opinions make the salience of a preference temporarily higher
than in the rest of the time span (reflected by a temporary increase of Zst from 0.3 to
0.6), due to modifications in the judgement of the experts, policy-makers, or
journalists. One can see that a low degree of individuality and a high degree of
conformity lead to a fast reaction to modifications in social opinions. If, however,
the degree of individuality is high and conformity is low, individuals do not adapt
quickly to temporary changes in social opinions. Figure 4 depicts the case where
changes in social opinions only last for one period and this change occurs in period
6. In this case, one could argue that the experts or policy-makers err for a short
period of time. A high degree of individuality and a low degree of conformity imply
that the temporary judgment errors reflected in the social norms have only a minor
impact on the salience of preferences.
This simple analysis shows that societies allowing a high degree of individuality
or showing a low degree of social conformity are not subject to overly fast changes
if social opinions are only altered for a very short period due to a short-term failure
of judgement by experts or politicians. However, at the same time, high
individuality and low conformity result in delayed adjustments when new
circumstances change social opinions for a long-period of time.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Low Degree of Individuality and High Degree of Conformity
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
High Degree of Individuality and Low Degree of Conformity
Fig. 4 Short-lasting changes in social opinions (Solid line baseline parameter values; Dashed line
Alternative)
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4 Conclusion
This paper has presented a simple model to illustrate how individuality and
conformity influence the salience of preferences of individuals. As I argued in this
paper, endogenous preference formation may be particularly important in macro-
economic contexts that are often characterized by a high degree of abstractness,
uniqueness and uncertainty. Using a simple model, I illustrated how the salience of
preferences changes with different degrees of individuality and conformity. Simple
simulation exercises show that a high degree of individuality or a low degree of
conformity can lead to delayed adjustments, while a low degree of individuality or a
high degree of conformity can lead to overreactions and inappropriate choices when
social opinion makers err for a short period of time. Individuality and conformity,
which are basic and crucial features of how a society is organized, play important
roles in the decision-making processes and have a significant influence on the
relative salience of preferences. The approach presented in this paper could be
useful in implementing simple processes in endogenous preference formation.
However, this paper is purely theoretical and does not include empirical
applications.
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